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The aim of this study is to analyze the interaction between capital structure
decisions and risk management decisions as well as the channels through
which they add value to firms. Competing theories are considered in an inte-
grated path model, which we test by means of meta-analytic structural equa-
tion modelling (MASEM). This meta-analysis is based on 6,312 reported
results, which are manually collected from 411 empirical studies. We find that
capital structure mediates the relation between corporate financial hedging
and firm value. In this regard, active risk management positively affects lever-
age by providing greater debt capacities. Furthermore, leverage has a negative
impact on firm value. Hence, capital structure and financial hedging decisions
appear rather as complements instead of substitutes. This implies that man-
agers should leave additional debt capacities unused and instead use additional
internal funds arising from active risk management to carry out profitable pro-
jects and research and development activities. Overall, corporate hedging is
found to especially add value to a firm by lowering bankruptcy risks and
underinvestment risks.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Both theory and empirical evidence are mixed regarding
the questions of when and how capital structure and risk
management decisions affect firm value. Consequently,
the question arises whether financial decisions should be
integrated in corporate decision-making following the
maximization of economic gains – strictly speaking, the
maximization of firm values – as a leading objective. Fol-
lowing the neoclassical Modigliani-Miller theorem sup-
posing a firm's cost of capital to be independent from
financial decisions (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), manage-
rial decision makers should neglect financial decisions
and instead focus on maximizing operational perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, companies frequently refer to
financial decisions in their reports. For example, the
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German airline Lufthansa proclaims that “financial strat-
egy is the basis for all main planning and decision-mak-
ing processes” (Lufthansa Group, 2017). For the Dutch
technology company Philips, “risk management forms an
integral part of the business planning and review cycle”
(Royal Philips, 2017). And the Austrian oil and gas com-
pany OMV states that “strategic commodity risks are
managed centrally […]” using “financial instruments
only” (OMV, 2017).
In line with the observation that companies often
account for financial decision as integral part of corporate
management, more recent theory states that financial
decisions might affect firm value. However, there is a
diversity of hypotheses for different theoretical relations.
Allayannis and Weston (2001) hypothesize in their semi-
nal work that corporate hedging activities might have a
direct impact on firm value. Among others, this might be
reasoned by the fact that the use of financial hedging
instruments (to mitigate secondary risks) may be a signal
for good management quality, which is thus rewarded by
shareholders (Lookman, 2004). Alternatively, capital
structure might have a mediating role in the relation
between corporate hedging and firm value. In this regard,
firms may benefit from higher debt capacity if corporate
hedging activities reduce the probability of financial dis-
tress in the first step of the mediating effect (Leland, 1998;
Ross, 1977). This is also empirically confirmed by Gra-
ham and Rogers (2002). Since firms are expected to not
fully exploit additional debt capacity, a second source of
added value might stem from lower distress costs
resulting from unused debt capacity (Leland, 1998). In
contrast, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) developed a
concept that corporate hedging is negatively related to
leverage in the first step of the mediating effect. Accord-
ingly, firms benefit from corporate hedging since it helps
to coordinate internal funds (Loss, 2012), which in turn
avoids costly external financing. In the second step of the
mediating effect, leverage might be negatively related to
firm value, as argued by Fama and French (1998). They
hypothesize negative information of debt concerning the
firm's (expected) profitability. According to the alterna-
tive traditional tax hypothesis, leverage might have a pos-
itive impact on firm value (Fama & French, 1998). Since
interest rates are deductible, firm value increases by the
market value of corporate tax savings. This brief excerpt
from existing theory illustrates the previously mentioned
diversity of hypotheses for different theoretical relations
in this field of research.
Besides the diversity in theory, there exist many
empirical studies in the field. However, they suffer from
heterogeneous results as Aretz and Bartram (2010),
Arnold, Rathgeber, and Stöckl (2014), and Geyer-
Klingeberg, Hang, and Rathgeber (2019b), as well as
Fauver and Naranjo (2010) observe in the primary
research on the determinants of corporate hedging. This
heterogeneity is also detected in the field of capital struc-
ture determinants (among others, An, Li, & Yu, 2016;
Hang, Geyer-Klingeberg, Rathgeber, & Stöckl, 2018;
Hovakimian, 2006; Strebulaev, 2007), as well as for the
hedging and firm value link (among others, Allayannis &
Weston, 2001; Carter, Rogers, & Simkins, 2006; Geyer-
Klingeberg, Hang, & Rathgeber, 2019a; Gilje & Tai-
llard, 2017; Jin & Jorion, 2006). Accordingly, the chan-
nels through which financial decisions affect firm value
are ambiguous. In a recent publication, Gilje and Tai-
llard (2017) address this issue and find that corporate
hedging adds value to the firm by reducing bankruptcy
risks and underinvestment problems. More advanced the-
ories attempt to bring the separate but complementary
research questions together by simultaneously modelling
different financial management decisions (among others,
Froot et al., 1993; C.-M. Lin, Phillips, & Smith, 2008;
Ross, 1977). However, a general comprehension of each
field is difficult due the strongly mixed evidence, which
indeed underscores the complexity of the interactions.
Due to the importance and scope of financial manage-
ment in research and practice, the rationales and implica-
tions of financial decisions are also a central issue of
contemporary strategic management research (among
others, Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen, & van
Oosterhout, 2011; Gamba & Triantis, 2013; Hoskisson,
Chirico, Zyung, & Gambeta, 2017; Liu, van Jaarsveld,
Batt, & Frost, 2014).
The aim of this study is to analyze the interactions
between capital structure decisions and corporate hedg-
ing decisions, as well as the channels through which they
add value to the firm. As a theoretical basis, we derive a
path model incorporating the alternative theories men-
tioned above. This allows statistically testing of the direct
impact of corporate hedging activities on firm value as
opposed to the mediating role of capital structure for this
relation. Overall, this approach contributes to the litera-
ture as follows. (a) The analysis of mediating effects con-
tributes to how financial decisions interact and influence
firm value referring to the causality among these vari-
ables. (b) Testing several moderating factors allows the
analysis of the heterogeneity among the reported results
and might reveal when corresponding effects particularly
occur. To analyze the path model, we apply statistical
meta-analysis by combining 6,312 reported results, which
are manually collected from 411 existing empirical pri-
mary studies from the past 30 years, and based on a
cumulative 2,572,731 firm observations.
To address our first research question of how corpo-
rate capital structure and financial hedging decisions
interact, we simultaneously test the competing theories
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on the nexus among capital structure, corporate hedging,
and firm value via meta-analytic structural equation
modelling (MASEM; Cheung & Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran
& Ones, 1995), as recommended by Aretz and Bar-
tram (2010).1 To the best of our knowledge, our study
presents the first application of MASEM in finance. This
methodology has been recently developed to serve as an
excellent tool for testing new hypotheses and identifying
mediating effects at a meta-level (among others, Bergh
et al., 2016; Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2016; Car-
ney et al., 2011; Carney, van Essen, Gedajlovic, &
Heugens, 2015; Duran, Kammerlander, van Essen, &
Zellweger, 2016; Marcus, Taylor, Hastings, Sturm, &
Weigelt, 2016; Rosenbusch, Rauch, & Bausch, 2013;
Zeegers, Colonnesi, Stams, & Meins, 2017). Here, we
especially make use of MASEM to analyze bivariate rela-
tions from the diverse research strands in an integrated
way (Bergh et al., 2016), instead of separately aggregating
the reported results for each bivariate relation in our
path model. The MASEM approach contributes to the lit-
erature, as it considers the full body of existing empirical
literature in the two fields – capital structure and hedging
– and integrates them together with the determinants
of both financial decisions. Based on the integrated evi-
dence, we can test path models considering simultaneous
effects among the variables, especially the mediating
effects between capital structure and hedging. This allows
new insights for the research on the combined and inter-
acting effects among corporate financial decisions.
For a deeper understanding of the conditions for
when capital structure and hedging decisions impact firm
value as stated in our second research question, we con-
trast our MASEM results with the results derived from
(univariate) Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis
(HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985), which is, in general, a
simple mean effect calculation of the reported results for
each bivariate relation. In addition, HOMA allows
exploring the heterogeneity in reported results by study-
ing the influence of several moderating factors in the
form of subgroup analyses, following, among others,
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar (2006), Lee,
Kirkpatrick-Husk, and Madhavan (2014), and Bilgili
et al. (2016). Since the apparent heterogeneity is typically
greater than expected from random sampling error, sev-
eral factors could be responsible for the wide between-
study variability of reported results (Aretz & Bar-
tram, 2010; Harris & Raviv, 1991; C.-M. Lin et al., 2008;
Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). To address this problem,
we explicitly test for the influence of study characteristics
and data characteristics. In recent meta-analysis from
diverse research fields in management, economics, and
finance, these factors are consistently judged to be rea-
sonable as they are already confirmed to be related to the
results reported in empirical studies (Bilgili et al., 2016;
Carney et al., 2015; Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoglu, 2008;
Geyer-Klingeberg, Hang, & Rathgeber, 2020; Marano,
Arregle, Hitt, Spadafora, & van Essen, 2016; van Essen,
Otten, & Carberry, 2015). Thereby, we also address differ-
ent aspects of county-level differences on the impact of
capital structure and hedging decisions on corporate firm
value. Especially, we analyze differences in the effects
driven by regional differences, economic development,
and the law system. The examination of the heterogene-
ity drivers of the empirical findings for capital structure
and hedging provides new evidence on the conditions
driving the extent of the interactions of those effects and
their influence on firm value. Furthermore, meta-analysis
allows assessing whether or not publication selection bias
is present in a research field and correct for its distorting
effects. In general, publication selection bias refers to the
phenomenon that specific estimates are systematically
underrepresented in empirical literature
(Rosenthal, 1979). In other words, publication selection
bias exists when researchers prefer to report statistically
significant results (Stanley, 2005).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we present the theory behind the structural
relations in our path model. Subsequently, we introduce
the applied data set and meta-analytic methodologies in
Section 3. Section 4 continues with the presentation of
our results. After discussing the outcomes and limita-
tions, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 | THE ROLE OF CAPITAL
STRUCTURE AND HEDGING
DECISIONS ON FIRM VALUE
The starting point of this paper's theoretical consider-
ations is given by Modigliani and Miller (1958). In their
article they state that a firm's market value is indepen-
dent from financing decisions, assuming conditions of a
perfect capital market. This conclusion holds for debt-
equity choices (in the narrower sense) as well as for cor-
porate hedging decisions (in the broader sense) (Bes-
sembinder, 1991; Smith & Stulz, 1985). Consequently,
managers following the maximization of firm values as a
leading objective should ignore financial decisions and
instead focus on maximizing operational performance. In
contrast to this, more recent financial theory assumes
that market frictions create possibilities for financing
decisions to increase firm value via maximization of
shareholder value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kraus &
Litzenberger, 1973; Myers, 1984). This also sparks debate
on the role of corporate hedging for capital structure
decisions and firm value. In the following, we present the
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theoretical hypotheses for the integrated path model,
which is empirically tested in our meta-analysis, and
presented in Figure 1.
2.1 | The direct effect of corporate
hedging on firm value
We aim at shedding light on the effects of corporate
hedging activities on firm value. In this regard, we espe-
cially investigate the direct effect of corporate hedging on
firm value as well as the indirect effect via capital struc-
ture. Starting with the direct impact of corporate hedging
on firm value, Allayannis and Weston (2001) hypothesize
in their pioneering article that corporate hedging activi-
ties might also have a direct impact on firm value. In this
regard, Lookman (2004) concludes that hedging second-
ary risks is a positive indicator of management quality
(while hedging primary risk is supposed to mean the
opposite). Furthermore, hedging activities create signifi-
cant cash flow gains (e.g., due to positive developments
of the spot price over the contracted forward price),
which directly increase firm value without affecting firm
risk (Adam & Fernando, 2006). For these reasons, hedg-
ing firms might benefit from a higher market valuation
by equity investors. In contrast, firm values should not be
FIGURE 1 Path model. This figure presents the hypothetical path model as derived from theoretical literature. It contains the
determinants of corporate hedging, corporate financing strategy, and firm value. Additionally, we explicitly model the relations among these
three endogenous variables. The assumed causalities among the variables derived from theoretical literature are displayed by arrows, and the
direction of the influence is shown in circles. “+” and “−“correspond to a hypothetical positive or negative influence, respectively. “±”
means that there are competing accepted theories for both directions
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affected by hedging activities according to the managerial
utility maximization theory (Jin & Jorion, 2006). In this
regard, risk-averse managers are assumed to hedge firm
risks, if their personal wealth depends on the firm value
and hedging on the firm level is less costly than on a per-
sonal level (Smith & Stulz, 1985). Hence, managers usu-
ally claim extra compensation for such non-diversifiable
risks or hedge these risks at the firm level. However, if
the costs of hedging are smaller than the reduction in
extra compensation, firm value increases (Smith &
Stulz, 1985). Consequently, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
H1 Corporate hedging activities have a positive impact on
firms' market values.
2.2 | The mediating function of capital
structure
Continuing with the indirect impact of corporate hedging
on firm value, several researchers state a positive influence
of corporate hedging activities on leverage ratio in the first
step of the mediating effect (Graham & Rogers, 2002;
Leland, 1998; C.-M. Lin et al., 2008; Stulz, 1996). By
smoothing a firm's outcomes, hedging activities increase
debt capacities with regard to the realization of tax benefits
from higher interest deductions (Leland, 1998). In contrast,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop the idea that corporate
hedging is negatively related to leverage ratio. Accordingly,
a smaller amount of hedging activities for a firm creates
value in terms of high levels of external financing – depen-
dent on a high probability of upper tail outcomes.
According to Froot et al. (1993), hedging might also avoid
costly external financing. It can be argued that when exter-
nal capital is more costly than internal funds, hedging
activities contribute to the availability of internal funds
and, thus, alter a firm's leverage by lowering earnings vola-
tility. Thereby a firm benefits from additionally profitable
investment opportunities. These considerations produce
the following hypothesis:
H2a Corporate hedging activities have a direct (positive
or negative) impact on a firm's capital structure.
The subsequent second step of the indirect effect indi-
cates a potential relation between capital structure and
firm value. According to the traditional tax hypothesis,
debt might have a positive impact on firm value (Fama &
French, 1998). Since interest rates are deductible, firm
value increases by the market value of corporate tax sav-
ings. Furthermore, firms might also increase perfor-
mance by investing additional external capital in
profitable projects (Graham & Rogers, 2002; C.-M. Lin
et al., 2008). Since firms are expected to not fully exploit
the additional debt capacity, a further source of added
value comes from lower distress costs due to unused debt
capacity (Leland, 1998). The latter is, however, not seen
to be a dominant force in the relation between leverage
and firm value (Ross, 1977). Alternatively, following the
findings by Fama and French (1998), an increasing lever-
age ratio might also negatively affect firm value because
of the negative signal effect of debt concerning the firm's
(expected) profitability (Miller & Rock, 1985). This con-
clusion could be drawn by the fact that debt causes
agency problems between stockowners and bondholders
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Hence, profit-
able firms might prefer equity financing in order to avoid
potential agency problems of debt. Moreover, the pecking
order theory developed by Myers and Majluf (1984)
underscores a preference for investing with internal
funds in particular. If liquidity is great enough, a firm
would carry out all projects with a positive net present
value without causing information asymmetry problems
by issuing debt or equity. Hence, a firm would prefer to
reserve excess liquidity and to lower leverage in order to
enhance firm value. The associated hypothesis can be for-
mulated as follows:
H2b Capital structure has a direct (positive or negative)
impact on firm value.
2.3 | Further model paths
As commonly employed in prior primary studies, we also
account for the most frequently used control variables in
our path model.
In the field of corporate hedging, the following theo-
ries build on the presence of market frictions in order to
explain rationales for corporate hedging. Following Aretz
and Bartram, these market frictions can be summarized
as asymmetric information, agency conflicts of equity,
agency conflicts of debt, costs of bankruptcy and financial
distress, and corporate taxes. In line with existing
research, we test these theories using the following set of
proxy variables: dividend yield (DIV), profitability
(PROF), research and development (RD), tangible assets
(TANG), firm size (SIZE), capital expenditures (CAPEX),
liquidity (LIQ), corporate tax rate (TAX), earnings volatil-
ity (EVOL), operational hedging (OH), firm growth
(GROW), and non-debt tax shield (NDTS). The
corresponding hypothesis is:
H3 The determinants of corporate hedging are responsible
for hedging decisions.
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In the same manner, the determinants of capital
structure are integrated in our path model, in order to
account for the two most prominent theories summarized
as trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973) and
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), although various
additional theories exist, such as market timing theory
(Baker & Wurgler, 2002), agency theory (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), signalling theory (Ross, 1977), or free
cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986).2 In line with previous
research, we test the mentioned theories using the fol-
lowing set of proxy variables: DIV, PROF, RD, TANG,
SIZE, CAPEX, LIQ, TAX, EVOL, GROW, and NDTS. The
considerations above imply the following hypothesis:
H4 The determinants of capital structure are responsible
for corporate financing decisions.
Finally, we follow relevant studies by Allayannis and
Weston (2001), Carter et al. (2006), and Jin and
Jorion (2006) and control for the direct impact of further
potential explanatory factors of firm value (in particular
DIV, PROF, RD, TANG, SIZE, and CAPEX), in addition
to corporate hedging activities.3
H5 The determinants of firm value are responsible for
changes in firms' market values.
3 | META-ANALYSIS
For our meta-analysis on the nexus between capital
structure, corporate hedging, and firm value, we use
previous empirical results, which we manually collected
from existing primary studies. In the following, we
describe the literature search procedure and the data
preparation followed by a description of the meta-ana-
lytic calculations. The data search complies with the
established guidelines published by the Meta-Analysis
of Economics Research Network described by (Stanley
et al., 2013).
3.1 | Literature search
We integrate reported results from two connected
research strands: studies investigating the determinants
of corporate hedging, as well as studies analyzing the
determinants of capital structure. This combination of
studies in our empirical meta-analysis is supported by the
fact that most of the determinants of corporate hedging
are also relevant for corporate capital structure (Aretz &
Bartram, 2010). Table 1 provides a detailed overview of
the literature search process.
To identify the set of relevant studies, we perform liter-
ature searches in the two research fields mentioned above.
During this literature search, we consider a study as rele-
vant when it meets the following inclusion criteria. First, a
study has to investigate non-financial firms, since financial
companies act very differently, such that their hedging
and capital structure decisions are fundamentally different
and often part of their business model (e.g., they act as
sellers of financial derivatives). Second, the study has to
analyze corporate hedging activities (measured by a hedg-
ing dummy variable) or capital structure (measured by
leverage ratio) as dependent variable, while considering
the associated determinants as independent variables.
Third, the study's sample size and a correlation matrix for
the examined variables must be reported in the study. If a
study reports more than one correlation table that is not
based on the full sample, the corresponding (sub-)sample
has to be reported for each correlation table.
For both strands of the literature, the search procedure
consists of the following six steps, as summed up in
Table 1, in order to cover the wide range of studies. First,
we searched in four electronic databases for published lit-
erature: (a) ABI/INFORM Complete (including disserta-
tions and theses), (b) Business Source Premier, (c)
EconLit, (d) EconBiz, (e) GreenFILE, and (f)
ScienceDirect. Second, we searched for gray literature via
the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Third, we
performed a backward search in papers' reference lists.
Fourth, we employed a forward search via the cited-by-
option in Google Scholar. Fifth, we searched each author's
publication list on their homepages and on Google Scholar
for related articles. Finally, we exchanged correspondence
with all authors of papers with missing information and
requested the respective correlation tables.
Overall, 411 primary studies from the past 30 years pro-
vide relevant correlation data for our meta-analysis. A com-
plete reference list of the study sample is available in the
Online Data S1. The sample includes 116 unpublished arti-
cles (27.23%). 158 studies investigate the determinants of
corporate hedging, the remaining 253 studies analyze the
determinants of corporate capital structure. The studies
report 6,312 relevant results in the form of Pearson correla-
tion coefficients (hereafter referred to as “effect size”) based
on a total of 2,572,731 firm observations.
3.2 | Data preparation
The study samples are checked for independence. In this
regard, we follow Hunter and Schmidt (2004) and Stanley
and Doucouliagos (2012) suggesting that two or more
studies are assumed to be independent if different
authors use the same/similar data set or if the same
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TABLE 1 Literature search in electronic databases for corporate capital structure
Literature search process Capital structure literature Hedging literature
Inclusion criteria
1. Appropriate definition of the variable of
interest
Capital structure has to be analyzed as
dependent variable in the primary studies.
The hedging decision has to be analyzed as
dependent variable in the primary studies.
2. Appropriate data for effect-size
calculation
The study contains sufficient information
about the correlation between capital
structure and the examined proxy
variables or/and the correlations among
the proxy variables themselves.
The study contains sufficient information
about the correlation between the hedging
dummy and the examined proxy variables
or/and the correlations among the proxy
variables themselves. Otherwise, there
must be sufficient data from the
descriptive statistics (e.g., t-statistic from a
test with independent groups or the
standardized mean difference between the
hedgers and non-hedgers group) to
replicate the correlations according to
accepted conversions (Borenstein 2009).
3. Extractable sample size The study's sample size must be extractable
for each correlation table in order to
calculate the effect size variation and the
study weight.
The study's sample size must be extractable
for each correlation table in order to
calculate the effect size variation and the
study weight.
4. Only non-financial firms The study investigates non-financial firms.
However, we do not exclude studies
containing both financial and non-
financial firms, if the sample was taken
from a broad stock market index.
The study investigates non-financial firms.
However, we do not exclude studies
containing both financial and non-
financial firms, if the sample was taken
from a broad stock market index.
Search command (Title:((capital structure OR Leverage OR
Financing) AND (deter* OR affect* OR
predict* OR factor* OR sample* OR
evidence OR result* OR data OR
investigat* OR test* OR empiric* OR
survey* OR examine*)))
(All Fields: hedg* OR derivative* AND All
Fields: use OR using OR usage OR polic*
OR activit* AND All Fields: compan* OR
corporat* OR firm AND All Fields: sample
OR evidence OR result* OR data OR
investigat* OR test* OR empiric* OR
survey* OR examine*)
Search options Language: English, German
Date range: until November 19, 2015
Peer reviewed, working papers (SSRN)
Language: English, German
Date range: until June 24, 2014
Peer reviewed, working papers (SSRN)
Search results 2,022 3,814
Relevant after content check 474 91
Further steps
1. Additionally relevant studies from
backward search
145 31
2. Additionally relevant studies from
forward search
141 32
3. Additionally relevant studies from
authors' publication lists
0 13
Total number of relevant studies
without duplicates
591 167
Note: The table presents the details of the literature search procedure. First, the inclusion criteria for the literature search are defined. Fur-
ther, the individual search command as well as the search options are listed. Afterwards, the numbers of search results are noted together
with the numbers of remaining studies after checking the title in a first iteration and the content check in a second iteration. Based on the
relevant studies, a backward search, a forward search, as well as a check of the author's publication lists (for authors who wrote more than
one relevant study) are performed. The corresponding numbers are given below. The last row shows the total number of primary studies
integrated in the analysis of the study at hand.
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authors use different data sets. Consequently, we had to
exclude three studies investigating the determinants of
corporate hedging due to dependent data sets. If studies
use an identical sample of firms, we use each proxy vari-
able from this sample only once.4 However, we do not
control for overlapping samples across studies, as the aim
of meta-analysis is to aggregate propositions made in pri-
mary studies. Although studies might have overlapping
samples (e.g., when they are examining the same country
and similar time periods), each study reports an individ-
ual result due to study-specific variable definitions, indi-
vidual data preparation,5 and different data sources.
One requirement for the choice of variables used in
our meta-analysis is that each bivariate effect among the
integrated variables has to be observed at least once in the
sample of primary studies. Hence, our analysis is limited
to the greatest possible set of variables for which this con-
dition is fulfilled. Table 2 presents the set of included vari-
ables with the respective definitions and abbreviations. On
average, each mean correlation is calculated based on a set
of 47 primary studies and 215,427 firm observations.
From each of the 411 studies, we manually collected the
correlation matrices for capital structure decisions, hedging
decisions, and their interactions with other firm characteris-
tics. Moreover, we extracted the corresponding sample sizes.
Although all the studies in the sample empirically investi-
gate capital structure and hedging decisions, the study
designs and data sets examined vary widely. To account for
this heterogeneity, we also extracted the time period, coun-
tries under examination, the publication status of the paper
and other study characteristics reported in Table 3.
3.3 | HOMA procedure
To aggregate the collected effect sizes for the relations
between each of the endogenous variables in our path
model (LEV, DH, and FV) and its predictors, we compute
normally-distributed mean effect sizes using Hedges and
Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985).
The same methodology is used for moderator analysis
and is applied to several subgroups of the data.
From the i-th study included in our sample, we use the
correlation coefficient ri for the respective bivariate relation
as input for the calculations. The mean effect size for a
bivariate relation and its SD is consequently calculated by
r=
P
wi × rið ÞP
wi






where wi is the weight of the i-th correlation coefficient
calculated by the inverse variance of ri. Consequently,
the mean effect size r accounts for differences in preci-
sion and, hence, study quality by assigning study-specific
weights to each observation in a transparent, objective,
and replicable way (Borenstein, 2009). More precise
observations receive higher weights in meta-analysis.
In order to achieve normally distributed effect sizes,
we use Fisher's z-transformation to correct for skewness
in ri. Consequently, the z-transformed effect sizes are cal-
culated by
zi =0,5 ln 1+ ri1−ri
 
andSE zið Þ= 1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ni−3
p , ð2Þ
where ni is the number of firms associated with ri.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity in the effect
sizes, we apply the random effects meta-analysis model.
In essence, effect sizes are assumed to vary due to a
study-specific sampling error covered by the variance of
the effect size as well as due to randomly distributed
sources of heterogeneity, denoted by a random effects
component τ2. The random effects weights are then cal-
culated by the inverse sum of these two components.6
3.4 | MASEM procedure
Further, we employ MASEM to test the structural equa-
tions of the path model (Cheung & Chan, 2005;
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). The general idea is to use a set
of reported Pearson product–moment correlation tables to
calculate a full meta-analytic pooled correlation matrix by
estimating separate mean effect sizes for each bivariate
relationship using the HOMA procedure presented above.
The parameters of interest are estimated in the form
of a matrix A incorporating the structural parameters
between the variables, a matrix S contains the variances
and covariances among the variables, and a matrix F
used to select the observed variables (Jak, 2015). The gen-
eral model can be written as follows, for example for a
hypothetical model in the four variable case:
A=
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
β31 β32 0 0





ψ11 ψ12 0 0
ψ21 ψ22 0 0
0 0 ψ33 0






1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0






β31, for example, measures the effect of variable 3 on
variable 1, while ψ12 is the covariance between variable 1
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and variable 2. Overall, eight free parameters must be
estimated in the model in Equation (3) (ψ12 and ψ21 is
treated as one free parameter, since they are equal in
value). The corresponding number of degrees of freedom
is the difference between the number of observed (co-)
variances minus the number of free parameters. The
model-implied covariance matrix (Σ(θ)) can be calcu-
lated as a function of these matrices
Σ θð Þ= F−Að Þ−1S F−Að Þ−1T : ð4Þ
A better model fit is evaluated when the difference
between the model-implied covariance matrix Σ(θ) and
the observed covariance matrix Σ(θ̂ ) is smaller. There-
fore, the model parameters are estimated by minimizing
a discrepancy function. As common in MASEM, the
maximum-likelihood estimation is used (Cheung, 2015).
Accordingly, the discrepancy function can be written as
FML θð Þ= log Σ θð Þj j− log Σ θ̂
  + tr Σ θ̂ Σ θð Þ−1 −p,
ð5Þ
where p is the number of variables in the model. With an
increasing model fit, the more FML(θ) converges towards
zero (Jak, 2015).
We analyze the following system of equations
according to the path model:
FV = β1DH + β2LEV + β3DIV + β4PROF + β5RD
+ β6TANG+ β7SIZE+ β8CAPEX + ϵTQ,
ð6Þ
DH = β9DIV + β10PROF + β11RD+ β12TANG+ β13SIZE
+ β14CAPEX + β15LIQ+ β16TAX + β17EVOL
+ β18OH + β19GROW + β20NDTS+ ϵDH ,
ð7Þ
LEV = β21DH + β22DIV + β23PROF + β24RD+ β25TANG
+ β26SIZE+ β27CAPEX + β28LIQ+ β29TAX
+ β30EVOL+ β31GROW + β32NDTS+ ϵLEV :
ð8Þ
When employing a pooled correlation matrix for
MASEM, there are two main issues to consider. First, a
single sample size has to be chosen for fitting the model.
Following the consensus (among others, Carney
et al., 2015; Cheung, 2015; Sheng, Kong, Cortina, &
Hou, 2016) and recommendations of recent publications
(Landis, 2013), we use the harmonic mean of the across
the aggregated numbers of firms in the pooled correlation
matrix (as displayed in the upper triangular matrix of
Table 5) as a conservative estimate. In our case, the




Firm value FV (Logarithm of) Market value of
firm  book value of total
assets
Corporate hedging measure




Leverage ratio LEV Book value of long-term or total
debt (scaled)
Exogenous variables
Dividend yield DIV Dividend per share (scaled)
Profitability PROF (Logarithm of) Sales or return
on assets or EBIT (scaled)
Research and
development
RD Research and development
expenses (scaled)
Tangible assets TANG Tangible assets (scaled)
Size SIZE (Logarithm of) Book value of
total assets or market value of
the firm
Capital expenditures CAPEX Capital expenditures (scaled)
Liquidity LIQ Current assets or cash and cash
equivalents (scaled)
Tax rate TAX Marginal tax rate
Earnings volatility EVOL SD of earnings before interest
and taxes, return on assets
respectively
Operational hedging OH (Logarithm of) the absolute
amount of geographical or
industrial diversification
Growth GROW Yearly turnover growth (scaled)
Non-debt tax shield NDTS Depreciation plus amortization
(plus investment tax credits
and tax loss carryforwards)
(scaled)
Note: This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the multi-
variate meta-analysis of this study, including the abbreviation. Our
variable definitions arise from an aggregation of the variables in the
reviewed studies and are similar to those of the meta-analyses by
Aretz and Bartram (2010), Arnold et al. (2014), and Geyer-
Klingeberg et al. (2018). The descriptions are generalizations of the
study-specific variable definitions.
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harmonic mean number of firm observations is 3,661.
Alternatively, the arithmetic mean, the median, or the
total sample size are discussed in literature
(Cheung, 2015). However, the harmonic mean is judged
to be the most conservative estimate (Landis, 2013). Sec-
ond, following recent meta-analysis examples (among
others, Hamari & Keronen, 2017; Oort & Jak, 2016), we
decide to use unit SDs in the MASEM calculations, which
is necessary when treating the correlation matrix as a
covariance matrix. For a detailed description of the
MASEM calculations, see Cheung (2015) and Jak (2015).
4 | PRESENTATION OF META-
ANALYTICAL RESULTS
In the following, we present the meta-analytical results
derived from the HOMA and MASEM procedures.
TABLE 3 Overview of data coded from the primary studies
Variable Description
Effect size
ri Pearson correlation coefficients for the relation between one, several or all relation among the
variables defined in this table.




Published study =1 if a study is published in a referred journal
Unpublished study =1 if a study is an unpublished working paper or book chapter
Data characteristics
Mean year before 2000 =1 if [(sample start year + sample end year)  2] is before the year 2000
Mean year between 2000–2008 =1 if [(sample start year + sample end year)  2] is between the year 2000 and 2008
Mean year after 2008 =1 if [(sample start year + sample end year)  2] is after the year 2008
Single-industry sample =1 if the study sample examines on specific industry
Cross-sectional sample =1 if the study sample examines data across multiple industries
Regional differences
East Asia & Pacific =1 if a sample uses firm data from East Asia and the Pacific
Europe & Central Asia =1 if a sample uses firm data from Europe and Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean =1 if a sample uses firm data from Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa =1 if a sample uses firm data from Middle East and North Africa
North America =1 if a sample uses firm data from North America
South Asia =1 if a sample uses firm data from South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa =1 if a sample uses firm data from sub-Saharan Africa
Economic developmenta
Developed country =1 if a sample data refers to one or multiple developed countries
Developing country =1 if a sample data refers to one or multiple developing countries
Law systemb
Civil law system =1 if a sample data refers to one or multiple countries having a civil law legal system
Non-civil law system =1 if a sample data refers to one or multiple countries having a common law or other non-civil law
system
Note: This table presents the variables coded from the set of primary studies.
aData for this classification is taken from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): https://www.oecd.org/
dac/stats/documentupload/DAC List of ODA Recipients 2014 final.pdf.
bData for the classification into common and civil law countries is taken from the World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html.
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MASEM serves to test the central hypotheses H1, H2a and
H2b. Further, we use HOMA to test the hypotheses H3,
H4, and H5. Therein, we especially shed light on publica-
tion selection bias. Finally, we present results from the sub-
group analyses used to investigate factors causing
heterogeneity.
4.1 | HOMA results
Table 4 presents the univariate HOMA results. In particu-
lar, we analyze the factors affecting LEV, DH, and FV as
formulized in the corresponding hypotheses H3, H4 and
H5.7 First, referring to the effects of interest among the
endogenous variables themselves (LEV, DH, and FV), we
identify that LEV significantly depends on DH. The
results show a mean effect size of 0.075. Hence, we con-
clude that hedging activities lead to smoothed incomes,
which in turn increase debt capacity (Graham & Rog-
ers, 2002). Moreover, DH shows a statistically significant
relation to FV, with a mean effect size of 0.022. Although
the absolute effect is relatively small, the decision to
hedge might have a constantly positive impact on firm
value. Hence, our HOMA results verify previous findings
by, among others, Allayannis and Weston (2001) and
Carter et al. (2006). Consequently, investors might value
the available knowledge for corporate hedging activities
as well as smoothed earnings, independent from the
amount of the hedging volume. Following Jin and
Jorion (2006), we do not interpret the relation as an
impact of firm value on corporate hedging, since varia-
tions in market values are not assumed to predict corpo-
rate hedging behaviour. Besides, the result for the
relation between LEV and FV with a significant mean
effect size of −0.077 implies that higher levels of debt
financing increase costs of financing and bankruptcy due
to more volatile earnings, which in turn lead to a decreas-
ing firm value (Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Second, we also investigate the determinants of LEV,
DH, and FV using HOMA, thus observing the main deter-
minants of LEV as statistically significant mean effect sizes
for the dependence of LEV on PROF (−0.136), RD (−0.113),
TANG (0.115), and LIQ (−0.211). In the same way, we
reveal DIV, SIZE, OH, and EVOL as the main determinants
of DH. Furthermore, PROF and RD show the greatest mean
effect sizes for the relation to FV, with remarkable mean
correlation coefficients of 0.191 for PROF and 0.126 for RD,
both statistically significant at any significance level.
A summary of random effects mean effect sizes for all
bivariate relations among the analyzed endogenous and
exogenous variables is shown in Table 5 in the form of a
pooled correlation matrix. This matrix later serves as
input for the MASEM procedure.
4.2 | MASEM results
Before interpreting the results of the MASEM procedure
in order to examine the hypotheses H1, H2a, and H2b,
we evaluate the model fit. Following standard SEM, we
consult several test statistics simultaneously, in order to
obtain a reliable assessment. As presented in Table 6, we
use the following criteria to evaluate the goodness of fit:
chi-square (χ2), the comparative fit index (CFI), the root
mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), and the
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). The test
statistics result in χ2 = 56.82 (df = 10), CFI = 0.95,
RMSEA = 0.04, and SRMR = 0.02. Applying the conven-
tional limits from standard SEM allows us to conclude
that the model fits the data well (Hu & Bentler, 1999;
Marsh, Kit-Tai, & Zhong, 2004).
Starting with the MASEM results for the endogenous
variables, it becomes apparent that there is no significant
effect between DH and FV (β = 0.019, t = 1.185). In con-
trast to HOMA, hypothesis H1 cannot be accepted, which
might be due to the additional consideration of mediating
effects. Thus, investors do not directly value corporate
hedging activities as positive or negative. However, we
reveal a significant mediating effect, in that DH has a sta-
tistically significant positive relation with LEV
(β = 0.066, t = 3.994) in the first step of this indirect
effect. In the second step of the mediating effect, we find
that LEV has a negative relation with FV (β = −0.031,
t = −1.890). To evaluate the statistical significance of the
mediating effects, we perform statistical tests following
standard SEM procedure. The test results confirm the
mediation function of LEV for the relation between DH
and FV (Sobel test: t = −1.754, p = 0.079; Aroian test:
t = −1.713, p = 0.087; Goodman test: t = −1.797,
p = 0.072). Hence, hypothesis H2a as well as H2b can be
accepted. The result for the hedging-leverage link con-
firms the hypothesis developed by Graham and Rog-
ers (2002), Leland (1998), and Stulz (1996), supporting a
positive impact of corporate hedging activities on lever-
age ratio. This indicates that hedging is a means to
increase debt capacity, and is thus in line with recent
findings from, among others, Bartram et al. (2009),
Haushalter (2000), and Pérez-González and Yun (2013).
Additionally, the result for the leverage-firm value link
points to the hypothesis proposed by Leland (1998), who
states that distress costs decrease due to unused debt
capacity. Hence, firms should not make use of the possi-
bility to enhance the level of debt financing, due to the
potential negative impact on firm value. Although this
conclusion may seem contradictory at first, one might
also regard these two identified relations as intuitive,
since corporate hedging as well as (relatively) lower debt
levels support lower-risk earnings expectations. Due to
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the different signs of the two coefficients, the indirect
effect of DH on FV can be seen as a suppression effect.
Hence, there is no directly identifiable effect that explains
the occurrence of insignificant findings from regression
analysis in primary research (Jin & Jorion, 2006). For the
alternative direct effect of DH on FV, our results do not
show any statistically significant relation (β = 0.019,
t = 1.185). This result contradicts the findings by, among
others, Allayannis and Weston (2001), Clark and
Judge (2009), and Pérez-González and Yun (2013), who
observe a significant direct effect of corporate hedging
activities on firm value. Thus, our results confirm an
overall mediating effect.8
For a complete understanding of the meta-analytic
results, we further calculate the total effects of all ana-
lyzed variables on firm value. Table 7 sums up the esti-
mates of the total effects. As the results show, there are
two dominating effects. First, PROF is revealed to be the
main driver of FV with a significant total effect of 0.201.
Second, RD with a significant total effect of 0.118 might
be seen as an indicator of future growth opportunities.
Overall, firms are assumed to be valued by investors on
the basis of these two variables. Conversely, firms that
aim to maximize their firm value should increase their
profitability and future growth opportunities as a first-
order concern.
4.3 | Analysis of heterogeneity
As a further important result of the HOMA procedure,
we observe highly significant Q-statistics as displayed in
Table 4, which measure the amount of residual heteroge-
neity. Since most Q-statistics are statistically significant at
any significance level, we suppose multiple factors are
responsible for variations in the effect estimates reported
in primary studies. In the following, we analyze the het-
erogeneity for the relations among the endogenous vari-
ables (LEV, DH, and FV), which are integrated in our
path model. As is common in meta-analysis, we start
with testing for the existence of a potential publication
selection bias, typically performed in meta-analysis. This
bias refers to a phenomenon in meta-analysis that
authors prefer specific estimates and estimates deviating
TABLE 6 MASEM results
Dep. variable
FV DH LEV
Predictors β tβ β tβ β tβ
Endogenous variables
DH 0.019 1.185 0.066*** 3.994
LEV −0.031* −1.890
Exogenous variables
DIV −0.063*** −3.710 0.030* 1.699 0.005 0.293
PROF 0.200*** 11.772 0.089*** 5.179 −0.134*** −7.780
RD 0.116*** 6.871 0.109*** 6.356 −0.100*** −5.786
TANG −0.074*** −4.193 0.072*** 3.912 0.039** 2.131
SIZE −0.030* −1.765 0.178*** 10.068 0.073*** 4.230
CAPEX 0.047** 2.692 −0.006 −0.324 0.065*** 3.652
LIQ −0.076*** −4.409 −0.153*** −8.785
TAX 0.009 0.512 −0.022 −1.298
EVOL −0.109*** −6.215 0.044** 2.494
OH 0.107*** 5.998
GROW −0.069*** −4.002 0.040** 2.368
NDTS 0.018 1.061 0.002 0.125




N (harmonic mean) 3,661
Note: This table presents the model statistics from meta-analytic structural equation modelling.
*, ** and *** indicate a 10, 5, or 1% significance level, respectively.
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from these are systematically underrepresented in empir-
ical literature (Rosenthal, 1979). If, for example, literature
largely agrees on the sign and significance of a certain
determinant following an accepted theory, publication
selection might cause an over-representation of larger
and more significant confirming effects, leading to a dis-
torted comprehension of the available literature (Card &
Krueger, 1995; Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2013). To analyze
the presence of publication selection bias, we apply a
graphical investigation via funnel plots as standardly
applied in meta-analysis (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012).
Therein, the effect sizes (r) are plotted against their preci-
sion (1/SE(r) or sample size). Figure 2 shows funnel plots
of the effect sizes measuring the relations among the
endogenous variables, which are integrated in our analyt-
ical models. In general, funnel plots are able to reveal the
two existing types of publication bias (Stanley, 2005). If
authors prefer to publish significant estimates with a par-
ticular direction, the funnel would be overweighted on
one side (type I publication bias). If authors prefer to
publish significant estimates independent of their direc-
tion, the funnel would be hollow due to missing insignifi-
cant estimates and unreasonably wide (type I publication
bias). An unbiased sample should lead to a symmetrically
inverted funnel, meaning that deviations of the single
effect sizes from their mean value decrease with an
increasing precision of estimation. The funnel plots in
our case do not seem to speak for an existing obvious
publication selection bias, since the effect sizes are gener-
ally symmetrically distributed in a funnel form. The fun-
nel asymmetry (type II bias) is also checked by the so-
called Egger-test (Egger, Smith, Schneider, &
Minder, 1997), which statistically checks the relation
between r and 1/SE(r) and is commonly applied in meta-
analysis (see, among others, Stanley & Douc-
ouliagos, 2012). Analogous to the visual impression, the
test does not reveal any publication bias.9
In order to test the impact of further potential
influencing factors, we perform several subgroup ana-
lyses. Table 8 shows the associated results, where QB
measures the between-group heterogeneity. First, we
analyze if published studies report effect size estimates
differing from those of unpublished studies. Except for
the relation between FV and DH, we observe statistically
significant differences. In detail, unpublished studies
report larger positive effect estimates for the relation
between LEV and DH (QB = 33.439). In contrast, publi-
shed studies report larger negative effect estimates for the
relation between FV and LEV (QB = 3,707.089). Conse-
quently, unpublished studies contain additional informa-
tion, which should be integrated to derive general
conclusions, following the advice of Stanley and
Doucouliagos (2012).
Furthermore, we analyze data characteristics, particu-
larly temporal effects and differences between single-indus-
try and cross-sectional samples. When comparing the time
periods before 2000, between 2000 and 2008, and after
2008, we observe the following temporal developments.
The mean effect size for the relation between FV and DH
(QB = 49.187) decreases over time, starting with a positive
value before 2000, and ending with a negative value after
2008. In contrast, the relation between LEV and DH
(QB = 61.152) increases across the time periods with a
remarkable mean effect size of 0.186 in the period after
2008. For the relation between FV and LEV
(QB = 2,278.698), the mean effect size becomes more nega-
tive over time, with an exceptional mean effect size of
−0.176 for the period after 2008. Consequently, in recent
years investors have begun to consider hedging activities as
well as higher levels of external financing as more negative
indicators of firm value. In contrast, an increase in debt
capacity due to hedging activities has strongly emerged.
Regarding the studies' sample compositions, we reveal sig-
nificant differences between single-industry and cross-sec-
tional samples for the relations between FV and DH
(QB = 12.205) and between FV and LEV (QB = 383.118).
Consequently, industrial effects exist, which affect the
TABLE 7 Total effects on firm value
Dep. variable
FV
Predictors βtotal tβtotal p-value
Endogenous variables
DH 0.017 1.063 0.298
LEV −0.031* −1.890 0.059
Exogenous variables
DIV −0.062*** −3.683 0.000
PROF 0.201*** 11.889 0.000
RD 0.118*** 7.005 0.000
TANG −0.073*** −4.139 0.000
SIZE −0.027 −1.618 0.106
CAPEX 0.047*** 2.686 0.007
LIQ 0.001 −1.033 0.302
TAX 0.000 0.461 0.645
EVOL 0.002 1.047 0.295
OH −0.002 −1.048 0.295
GROW −0.001 −1.027 0.304
NDTS 0.000 0.751 0.453
Note: This table presents the calculated total effects on firm value
(sum of direct plus indirect effects) of the analyzed variables. The
values are calculated for the path model of the decision to hedge
based on the corresponding MASEM results.
*, ** and *** indicate a 10, 5, or 1% significance level, respectively.
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relations among our endogenous variables, especially the
relations involving capital structure. Reasons for this might
be industrial differences in the costs of financial distress
(Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984), agency costs (Hall,
Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2010), or asymmetric informa-
tion (Myers, 1984).
When comparing the mean effect sizes among our
endogenous variables for various geographic regions, we
FIGURE 2 Funnel plots. This tables presents the
funnel plots for the relations among corporate hedging
(DH), leverage ratio (LEV), and firm value (FV). The z-
transformed effect sizes (correlation coefficients) are
plotted against their precision (inverse SE)
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observe deviations for the relations between FV and DH
(QB = 68.191), LEV and DH (QB = 112.536), and FV and
LEV (QB = 648.843). This result indicates that cross-coun-
try differences drive the mentioned effects. In addition to
common cross-country differences, other factors may
play a role, such as macroeconomic, political or legal dif-
ferences, cultural differences (Chui, Lloyd, & Kwok, 2002)
or even consequences of globalization (Fernandes, 2011).
To study the influence of a country‘s economic devel-
opment, we further split our sample into developed and
developing countries. For the relation between FV and
DH (QB = 11.162), the difference between the subgroup-
specific mean effect sizes is statistically significant. This
result implies that market valuation of hedging activities
seems to differ between developed and developing coun-
tries. In detail, the decision to hedge increases firm values
in developing countries (with a mean effect size of 0.066)
more than in developed countries (0.012). This observa-
tion might be reasoned by higher political and market
risks in developing countries (Bartram et al., 2009).
According to Fernandes (2011), differences in financial
decisions will, however, disappear over time and the
mean effect sizes will converge since globalization con-
tributes to economic integration and helps to overcome
domestic limitations of firms located in developing
countries.
Finally, we test the impact of different legal systems.
Differences among the mean effect sizes for civil law and
non-civil law countries exist for the relations between FV
and DH (QB = 13.990), LEV and DH (QB = 5.420), and
FV and LEV (QB = 190.653). Consequently, differences in
jurisdiction and regulation also affect the nexus among
FV, DH, and LEV, since a country's legal environment is
assumed to affect corporate debt policies (Bancel &
Mittoo, 2004; Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi, & Spiegel, 2011;
Cambini & Spiegel, 2016) as well as incentives to hedge
(Aretz & Bartram, 2010).
4.4 | Discussion
Based on our results, we are able to derive several conclu-
sions for economic theory as well as corporate decision-
making.
4.4.1 | Economic implications
Starting with the HOMA results for the determinants of
capital structure, the impacts of PROF (negative), RD
(negative), TANG (positive), and LIQ (negative) on LEV
consistently point to the pecking order theory (Myers &
Majluf, 1984). Consequently, our results imply that the
costs of financing increase by the degree of information
asymmetry. This finding is consistent with results from
the MASEM procedure. Continuing with the HOMA
results for the determinants of corporate hedging, the
effects of DIV (positive), PROF (positive), and LIQ (nega-
tive) point to the costs of bankruptcy and financial dis-
tress hypothesis (Smith & Stulz, 1985). Thus, corporate
hedging activities are assumed to lower cash flow volatil-
ity (and therefore also the default probability), which
reduces expected costs of financial distress and adds
value to the firm. In the same manner, RD (positive) and
TANG (positive) support the coordination of financing
and investment and the agency conflicts of debt hypothe-
sis. Hence, a reduced cash flow variability increases the
probability of shareholders being the residual owners
after reimbursing the bondholders and coordinates the
availability of internal funds (Loss, 2012). Further, hedg-
ing lowers project risks and accordingly diminishes
agency costs arising from the managerial incentive of
asset substitution. These findings correspond with our
MASEM results and the findings from previous research
(Aretz & Bartram, 2010; Arnold et al., 2014; Geyer-
Klingeberg et al., 2018). Overall, we find no evidence for
tax incentives influencing capital structure or hedging
decisions.
Keeping the above conclusions in mind allows for
consistent interpretation of the results for the relations
among the endogenous variables. Regarding the positive
impact on LEV from DH, we conclude that firms might
make use of this effect particularly via unused debt
capacities. If a firm would in contrast extend debt financ-
ing due to increased debt capacities, this would lead to
increasing tax benefits but also to increasing costs of
bankruptcy and financial distress. This would contradict
the results for the determinants of capital structure and
corporate hedging, since we find no evidence for tax
effects but rather for the motivation of firms to minimize
the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Conse-
quently, we conclude that firms might especially profit
from unused debt capacity (Leland, 1998). Analogously,
for the negative relation between LEV and FV, we further
conclude that internal funds should be preferred against
debt financing. By lowering earnings volatility, corporate
hedging further increases the possibility of available
internal funds and of the shareholders being the residual
owner after satisfying bondholder claims (Froot
et al., 1993). Hence, our results concerning the mediating
role of capital structure are fully in line with the work by
Gilje and Taillard (2017) who state that corporate hedg-
ing especially serves to reduce potential bankruptcy and
underinvestment risks. Following the concept of share-
holder value maximization, these financial resources
should be used to enhance profitability and research and
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development activity. Overall, our results explain the
decision to hedge primarily as a means to coordinate
financing and investment decisions, which thereby
reduces distress costs resulting from unused debt capacity
and enhances a firm's profitability as well as value, by
providing additional internal funds to realize profitable
projects and future growth opportunities.
4.4.2 | Limitations
Although, the strength of MASEM is to replicate existing
analyses and to test various hypotheses on data reported
by prior studies, including correlations and sample sizes
(Jak, 2015). However, the dependency on existing data
also limits the conclusions of results produced by this
methodology. Hence, the interpretation of MASEM coef-
ficients as causal effects is only possible at the same level
as in prior studies. Here, more primary studies are neces-
sary using lagged versions of the latent variables, which
would enhance the interpretability of the interaction
effects in terms of the endogeneity problem.
Beyond the applied univariate version of MASEM,
two alternatives exist: the multivariate (GLS) MASEM
and the two-stage SEM (TTSEM). Although, the latter
two versions dominate the univariate version by their sta-
tistical properties, the univariate version is applied in this
study as the most widely spread version for the following
reasons. First, the GLS approach requires that the vari-
ables integrated in the statistical path model are used in
most of the studies included in the meta-dataset. If each
variable is only analyzed in a smaller subset of the study-
sample (as in our case, due to the large set of variables),
the approach suffers from the large number of “missing
values” and does not converge. Second, in the TTSEM
approach only full correlation matrices can be summa-
rized. Hence, the majority of studies would have to be
excluded in this approach. Overall, the univariate
approach is preferred, since it allows analyzing the intro-
duced complex path model and does not require to cut
the number of analyzed variables in the model or the
number of studies included in the meta-dataset.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this meta-analysis, we use reported estimates from a
unique sample of 411 empirical studies to test the nexus
among capital structure, risk management, and firm
value. Here, the aim of this study is to analyze the inter-
action between capital structure decisions and risk man-
agement decisions as well as the channels through which
they add value to the firm. The main result from meta-
analytic structural equation modelling is that leverage
significantly mediates the effect of risk management on
firm value. In connection, risk management provides
firms with greater debt capacities; however, decision
makers should leave debt capacities unused, thus lower-
ing bankruptcy and financial distress costs. Moreover,
managers should utilize additionally available internal
funds from risk management for carrying out profitable
projects as well as promoting research and development
activities – the two main drivers of firm value. In this
manner, corporate hedging lowers potential underinvest-
ment problems. Hence, our findings concerning the
mediating role of capital structure are in line with Gilje
and Taillard (2017) stating that corporate hedging espe-
cially adds value to the firm by lowering bankruptcy and
underinvestment risks. Our moderator analysis further
confirms that these relations gain in importance over
time. Overall, our findings imply that capital structure
decisions and risk management should be jointly consid-
ered by managerial decision makers as important drivers
for maximization of firm value. Hence, these conclusions
constitute scientific confirmation and provide a further
justification for the observations from the corporate prac-
tices of, among others, Lufthansa Group, OMV, and
Royal Philips as presented at the beginning of this article.
Overall, our meta-analytical results are highly rele-
vant to corporate decision-making as well as future devel-
opments of management research. Our findings imply
that financing decisions (including capital structure and
risk management) are important drivers of firm value
and should be jointly considered by managerial decision-
makers for firm value maximization along with other
important factors, such as product quality (Phillips &
Sertsios, 2013), corporate social responsibility (Servaes &
Tamayo, 2013), and advertising expenditure
(Vitorino, 2013). Due to the observed mediating function
of capital structure, reported results from direct tests of
the risk management-firm value link might induce mis-
leading conclusions and should be carefully interpreted.
Instead, future empirical analyses should account for the
mediating role of capital structure decisions, implying
that consequences of financial decisions have to be con-
sidered in an integrated way. Future research questions
might cover more fine-grained analyses of the mediating
role of corporate financing and other elements of busi-
ness strategy for risk management, as well as the drivers
of heterogeneity for the relations among risk manage-
ment, capital structure, and firm value. This also includes
the analysis of causality between these variables, because
the meta-analysis applied in this study does not allow
interpretation of causal implications (Bergh et al., 2016).
Since we were not able to include further variables, such
as proxy variables for the asymmetric information
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friction (Manconi, Massa, & Zhang, 2018), this might also
be the subject of future studies. Further ideas might be
the consideration of endogenous relations, such as the
relation between dividend policy and capital structure
decisions (Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera Jr., &
Raymond, 1999) and the analysis of non-linear effects,
which might lead to more accurate results for particular
effects (for example, Crutchley et al., 1999).
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ENDNOTES
1 For example, structural equation modeling is applied in primary
analysis by Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009), Jin and
Jorion (2006), and Graham and Rogers (2002).
2 For an elaborate and comprehensive summary of the determi-
nants of capital structure, please refer to the studies by Frank and
Goyal (2009), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995),
and Titman and Wessels (1988).
3 Possible indirect effects of hedging activities on firm value via the
mentioned determinants are not explicitly tested in the path
model.
4 The studies by Bartram (Bartram, 2019; Bartram et al., 2009; Bar-
tram, Brown, & Conrad, 2011), Lin et al. (J. B. Lin, Pantzalis, &
Park, 2007; J. B. Lin, Pantzalis, & Park, 2010), and Nguyen and
Faff (Nguyen & Faff, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2010) are based on the
same data sample. As the studies by Nguyen and Faff additionally
investigate very similar variables, we had to exclude Nguyen and
Faff (2006) and Nguyen and Faff (2010) from our sample as they
do not contain additional variables.
5 Especially financial hedging data is often manually collected from
annual reports and, thus, the data collection and preparation
might strongly differ also across studies examining similar or
overlapping data sets.
6 For the calculation of τ2 and further explanations of the HOMA
procedure, please refer to Borenstein (2009), Carney et al. (2011),
or van Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, and Heugens (2015).
7 Since mean correlation coefficients are accepted as remarkable in
meta-analysis when they exceed 0.10 (Cohen, 1992), we focus
especially on the interpretation of determinants, for which the
HOMA procedure reveals a mean effect size equal to or larger
than 0.10.
8 Our results are in line with the findings of studies analyzing the
determinants of corporate hedging, which propose that debt ratio
has no opposing impact on corporate hedging behavior (Dono-
hoe (2015); Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997); Geyer-
Klingeberg, Hang, Rathgeber, and Stöckl (2018); Nance, Smith,
and Smithson (1993); Pérez-González and Yun (2013);
Tufano (1996)). For this reason, we do not interpret the reverse
causality.
9 The calculations are based on a weighted least squares estimation
with random effects. Since the results do not reveal significant
results, they are not reported in the work at hand. The results of
the Egger-test are available on request from the authors.
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